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ASSESSING FOURTH AMENDMENT
CHALLENGES TO DNA EXTRACTION STATUTES
AFTER SAMSON v. CALIFORNIA
Charles J. Nerko*
DNA plays an indispensable role in modern law enforcement, and courts
uniformly find that DNA extraction statutes targeting criminals satisfy the
Fourth Amendment. Courts differ on which Fourth Amendment test-
totality of the circumstances or special needs-ought to be employed in this
context. This Note concludes that courts should apply Samson v.
California's less stringent totality of the circumstances test to analyze DNA
extraction statutes in order to maintain the integrity of the special needs
test.
INTRODUCTION
In November 1990, an intruder stormed into an apartment shared by
twenty-one-year-old Ronald Taylor and his girlfriend.' The intruder shot
the young man multiple times and raped the woman.2 For seventeen years,
the perpetrator of this heinous act evaded investigators. 3 In 2007, DNA
samples isolated from the carpet and the woman's robe produced a match in
the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), a Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI)-administered computer database that links suspects to
DNA profiles extracted from crime scene evidence. 4 Because of this match
in CODIS, the Pima County Attorney's Office indicted a current inmate for
the crime. 5 With the aide of CODIS, law enforcement identified a potential
perpetrator who had evaded other investigation methods for seventeen
years.
* J.D. Candidate, 2009, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2006, Fordham College.
I would like to thank Professor Alison Nathan for her guidance during the Note-writing
process and my friends for their support. A special thanks to my family, especially my
parents Katherine and Charles, for all of their love and encouragement.
1. See Leasa Conze, DNA Leads to Break in Cold Case Murder and Rape, KOLD
NEWS 13, Dec. 19, 2007, http://www.kold.com/global/story.asp?s=7521786&ClientType=
Printable.
2. See Dale Quinn, DNA Throws New Light on '90 Rape, Slaying, ARIZ. DAILY STAR,
Dec. 20, 2007, http://www.azstamet.com/metro/217045.
3. See id.
4. See id.; see also Federal Bureau of Investigation, CODIS-National DNA Index
System, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/national.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2008).
5. See Conze, supra note 1.
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CODIS has solved thousands of cases and is unquestionably an
indispensable tool for modern law enforcement. 6 Recognizing the profound
and monumental crime-fighting interests that CODIS furthers, U.S. courts
of appeals have uniformly found that statutes authorizing DNA collection
comport with the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable
searches and seizures. 7
Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's 2006 decision in Samson v. California,
courts assessed Fourth Amendment challenges to DNA collection statutes
using the special needs test.8 In Samson, the Supreme Court established an
alternative Fourth Amendment mode of analysis in which a court can assess
a search program by examining the totality of the circumstances without
establishing the existence of a special need.9 Courts differ on which Fourth
Amendment test ought to be employed to assess DNA extraction statutes
and which test more rigorously and stringently protects the Fourth
Amendment. 10
Part I of this Note describes the applicable DNA extraction statutes and
Fourth Amendment approaches. Part II of this Note chronicles each Fourth
Amendment challenge to a DNA act decided by a U.S. court of appeals
after Samson, and Part III concludes that courts should follow the majority
of circuit courts by assessing Fourth Amendment challenges to DNA
extraction statutes under Samson's less stringent and rigorous totality of the
circumstances test.
I. DNA iN LAW ENFORCEMENT
DNA encodes genetic information about living organisms." Each
human has unique DNA. 12 By comparing the genetic material obtained
from a crime scene to a suspect's DNA, law enforcement can identify a
perpetrator by her genetic code. 13 Courts have highly favored this method
of identifying defendants. 14
6. See infra Part I.A.
7. See infra Part IIA-B.
8. See infra Parts I.B.2.b, II.A.
9. See infra Parts I.B.2.b, II.B.
10. See infra Part II.A-B.
11. See George Bundy Smith & Janet A. Gordon, The Admission of DNA Evidence in
State and Federal Courts, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 2465, 2465-66 (1997).
12. See id. However, identical twins have common DNA. See id. at 2465.
13. See id. at 2465-68 (discussing the scientific process of DNA identification); see also
Robert Aronson & Jacqueline McMurtrie, The Use and Misuse of High-Tech Evidence by
Prosecutors: Ethical and Evidentiary Issues, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 1453, 1469-73 (2007)
(providing an overview of the forms of DNA testing and observing that CODIS "has allowed
law enforcement agencies to solve thousands of 'cold cases' in a manner that is simply
unprecedented-some of them decades old and with no leads").
14. See Aronson & McMurtrie, supra note 13, at 1469, 1473-80 (observing that every
jurisdiction admits DNA evidence and analyzing the ethics and evidence issues presented by
such evidence); Thomas J. Moyer & Stephen P. Anway, Biotechnology and the Bar: A
Response to the Growing Divide Between Science and the Legal Environment, 22 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 671 (2007) (providing background information on the broader legal issues
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A. DNA Extraction Statutes
In recognition of the value of solving crimes through DNA-based
identification, the U.S. Congress authorized the FBI through the 1994
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act "to create a national
index of DNA samples taken from convicted offenders, crime scenes and
victims of crime, and unidentified human remains. '15  Subsequently,
Congress enacted the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000
(2000 DNA Act), which granted law enforcement the power to extract DNA
from any individual in prison or on parole, probation, or supervised release
convicted of certain enumerated felonies. 16 Congress later passed the
Justice for All Act of 2004 (2004 DNA Act) to require the collection of
DNA for those convicted of any felony, crime of violence, or sexual
crime. 17 As of June 2008, the CODIS database enables law enforcement to
presented by DNA evidence); Smith & Gordon, supra note 11, at 2477-88 (observing the
judicial acceptance of DNA evidence to be nearly "universal," but noting "[t]he issue still
remains of just how many other persons in the population could have the same [DNA] match
• . . [so] most states require statistical evidence with the admission of DNA evidence");
Thomas M. Fleming, Annotation, Admissibility of DNA Identification Evidence, 84
A.L.R.4th 313 (1991) (collecting cases on the admissibility of DNA identification evidence
and finding that courts generally admit such evidence). The uses of DNA other than
identifying criminal defendants by their own DNA extend beyond the scope of this Note. See
generally, e.g., Avida Landau, Israeli City Uses DNA to Fight Dog Poop, THOMSON
REUTERS, Sept. 16, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleld=USLG379
42520080916 (describing a new initiative in Petah Tikva, Israel, where the government will
collect dog DNA to identify dog owners that fail to remove dog feces from city streets).
15. See DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, H.R. REP. No. 106-900, pt. 1,
at 8 (2000), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2323, 2324.
16. See DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-546, § 3, 114
Stat. 2726, 2728-30 (2000) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14135a (2000)). The 2000 DNA Act
only applied to offenders convicted of the following crimes: murder, voluntary
manslaughter, or other offense relating to homicide; an offense relating to sexual abuse,
sexual exploitation or other abuse of children, or to transportation for illegal sexual activity;
an offense relating to peonage and slavery; kidnapping; an offense involving robbery or
burglary; any violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1153 involving murder, manslaughter, kidnapping,
maiming, a felony offense relating to sexual abuse, incest, arson, burglary, or robbery; and
any attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the above offenses. See 42 U.S.C. § 14135a.
The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act) expanded the list of
qualifying federal offenses to include acts of terrorism (as defined in 18 U.S.C. §
2332b(g)(5)(B)) and additional crimes of violence (as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16). See 42
U.S.C. § 14135a(d)(3) (Supp. 2005). For a complete list of qualifying federal offenses, see
28 C.F.R. § 28.2 (2005). Many states also have their own analogues of the federal DNA
Acts. See Gordon Thomas Honeywell Government Affairs, DNA Database Legislative
Expansion, http://www.dnaresource.com/expansion.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2008)
(providing links to annual reports collecting proposed and enacted DNA database expansion
legislation).
17. See Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 203(b), 118 Stat. 2260, 2270 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 14135a(d)). While Congress later amended the Act to authorize the DNA collection from
arrestees, see Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, § 1004(a), 119 Stat. 2960, 3085 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §
14135a(a)(l)(A)), no U.S. court of appeals has assessed the constitutionality of this broad
expansion of the Act.
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match DNA samples collected from crime scenes to 6,031,000 convicted
offenders. 18
While some commentators have claimed that CODIS permits the
government to engage in biological or behavioral research, others have
shown that such fears lack foundation. 19  To prevent abuse, federal
legislation provides weighty penalties for the unauthorized use of DNA
samples. 20 Each act of unauthorized collection, use, or disclosure of a DNA
sample constitutes a separate crime, subjecting the offender to a quarter-
million-dollar fine and a one-year prison sentence. 21  This statutory
safeguard ensures that CODIS's DNA records will be used for fighting
crime and not for nefarious purposes.
B. Fourth Amendment Approaches
This section summarizes the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence germane
to DNA extraction. Courts have alternated between two different tests to
assess Fourth Amendment challenges to DNA extraction. Part I.B.1
describes the special needs doctrine and Part I.B.2 explores the totality of
the circumstances test.
The Fourth Amendment ensures that people will "be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures" and that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." '22
Since the Fourth Amendment only applies to searches and seizures,
courts assess the threshold inquiry of whether an action constitutes a search
or seizure by Justice John M. Harlan's formulation in Katz v. United States:
a search or seizure occurs when the government invades the privacy of an
individual who has an actual subjective expectation of privacy that society
objectively recognizes as reasonable. 23 Over the years, Justice Harlan's
18. See Federal Bureau of Investigation-Laboratory Services, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/
lab/codis/clickmap.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2008).
19. See Davina Dana Bressler, Note, Criminal DNA Databank Statutes and Medical
Research, 43 JURIMETRICS J. 51 (2002) (debunking claims that CODIS can be used for
invasive research or non-law enforcement purposes).
20. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14135e(c) (2005).
21. See id.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
23. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). A
public display negates a reasonable expectation of privacy. See id. at 351-52 (majority
opinion) ("What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office,
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." (citing Lewis v.
United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960); United
States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877))); see
also California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988) (finding no expectation of privacy in
garbage bags awaiting collection from curb); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 436-40
(1976) (finding no expectation of privacy in depositor's checks, deposit slips, financial
statements, and monthly statements viewable by bank employees); United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) (finding no expectation of privacy in sound of voice); United
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two-part test has collapsed into a "reasonable expectation of privacy"
standard focusing on objective social expectations. 24 Thus, courts apply
Fourth Amendment protections even without a subjective expectation of
privacy, since "constitutional rights are generally not defined by the
subjective intent of those asserting the rights. '25 As applied to the federal
DNA Acts, the extraction 26 and analysis 27 of DNA constitute two distinct
searches, each triggering Fourth Amendment scrutiny.
As the extraction and analysis of DNA constitute two distinct searches to
be assessed under the Fourth Amendment, the degree of Fourth Amendment
scrutiny depends on how one interprets the relationship of the Fourth
Amendment's two clauses: the Reasonableness Clause and the Warrant
Clause.28 Historically, the Supreme Court interpreted these phrases in a
concatenated fashion, so that the Warrant Clause modified the
Reasonableness Clause. 29 This unitary reading of the Fourth Amendment
would deem a search reasonable only if based on individualized suspicion
sufficient to constitute probable cause and executed pursuant to a warrant
with the requisite specificity.30
Under a unitary reading of the Fourth Amendment, the warrant
requirement determines reasonableness.31 However, the Fourth
Amendment's text only proscribes unreasonable searches and seizures. 32
Consequently, the Supreme Court has recognized that constitutionally
permitted searches do not necessarily require probable cause or a warrant. 33
States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21-22 (1973) (finding no expectation of privacy in handwriting
sample).
24. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 n.7 (1984) (deeming the second criterion
of Justice Harlan's standard articulated in Katz to be "controlling").
25. See id.; see also Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REv. 349, 384 (1974) ("An actual, subjective expectation of privacy... can neither
add to, nor can its absence detract from, an individual's claim to fourth amendment
protection. If it could, the government could diminish each person's subjective expectation
of privacy merely by announcing ... that we were all forthwith being placed under
comprehensive electronic surveillance.").
26. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989) (deeming a
forced blood extraction to be a search).
27. See id. at 617 (deeming testing of urine a search since, like blood testing, urine
testing can "reveal a host of private medical facts," such as the presence of diseases).
28. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
29. See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972)
("Though the Fourth Amendment speaks broadly of 'unreasonable searches and seizures,'
the definition of 'reasonableness' turns, at least in part, on the more specific commands of
the warrant clause.").
30. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; United States v. Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d 261, 265 (D.
Mass. 2007), rev'd on other grounds, 532 F.3d 32 (1 st Cir. 2008).
31. See Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 266 ("Under [the unitary] interpretation [of the
Fourth Amendment], a search would be reasonable only if supported by probable cause and
executed pursuant to a warrant specifically describing its scope." (emphasis omitted)).
32. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
33. See Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) ("[A] warrant is not
required to establish the reasonableness of all government searches; and when a warrant is
not required (and the Warrant Clause therefore not applicable), probable cause is not
invariably required either."). For a textual and historical analysis of the interplay of the
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Though the Fourth Amendment only mandates reasonableness, courts still
prefer searches conducted pursuant to a warrant. 34 The preference for a
warrant notwithstanding, the Supreme Court has deemed reasonable a
multitude of searches conducted without a warrant or individualized
suspicion, such as random drug testing of students participating in
extracurricular activities, 35 searches at fixed checkpoints, 36 routine border
searches, 37 inventory searches, 38 administrative searches of closely
regulated industries, 39 and searches of parolees.40
1. Special Needs
The special needs doctrine allows courts to invoke an "exception" to the
Fourth Amendment's requirements that searches be conducted with a
warrant or individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.41 Courts justify many
Warrant Clause to the Fourth Amendment, see Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REv. 757 (1994). Historically, warrants were viewed as hostile to
citizens' rights, since warrants immunized government agents that conducted unreasonable
searches from trespass liability. See id. at 774. Consequently, the Fourth Amendment
restricted the availability of warrants to prevent the government from using ex parte
proceedings to exculpate its agents from tort liability for unreasonable searches. See id.
Professor Amar thus contends, "the Framers did say what they meant, and what they said
makes eminent good sense: all searches and seizures must be reasonable. Precisely because
these searches and seizures can occur in all shapes and sizes under a wide variety of
circumstances, the Framers chose a suitably general command." Id. at 771; see also Michael
Longyear, Note, To Attach or Not to Attach: The Continued Confusion Regarding Search
Warrants and the Incorporation of Supporting Documents, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 387, 394-
96 (2007) (observing that the focus of the Fourth Amendment has shifted from banning
general warrants to reasonableness).
34. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913-14 (1984) (indicating that the Court
has a "strong preference" for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant, since warrants
require scrutiny from a neutral magistrate instead of the searching officer); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 155-56 (1925) (equating probable cause with reasonableness to assess
the constitutionality of warrantless searches and seizures).
35. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654-65 (upholding suspicionless drug testing of student
athletes); see also Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002)
(extending Vernonia's holding to permit random drug testing of students participating in any
extracurricular activity).
36. See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427 (2004) (upholding under the special needs
doctrine an information-gathering checkpoint pertaining to a recent hit-and-run accident that
occurred at the same location); Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451-55
(1990) (upholding a sobriety checkpoint under the special needs doctrine).
37. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 (2004) (approving
suspicionless disassembly and search of a vehicle's fuel tank as part of a routine border
search).
38. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371-76 (1987) (permitting search of
impounded van after operator's arrest for driving while under the influence of alcohol).
39. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 693, 702-03 (1987) (upholding New York
statute allowing warrantless inspections of motor vehicle junkyards).
40. See infra Part I.B.2.b.
41. See United States v. Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d 261, 267 (D. Mass. 2007), rev'd on
other grounds, 532 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2008) ("The 'special needs' exception is often invoked
as a corollary to the administrative search exception either to validate a general suspicionless
and warrantless search or in specific situations where a search is required but obtaining a
warrant would be impracticable."). See generally 3A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
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searches conducted without a warrant or individualized suspicion under this
doctrine. 42 Justice Harry A. Blackmun first coined the phrase "special
needs" in the concurring opinion of New Jersey v. T.L.O.43 In upholding
the constitutionality of a school administrator's search of a pupil's purse
after a teacher observed the student smoking, Justice Blackmun clarified
that limited exceptions to the probable cause requirement justify searches
based upon "'a careful balancing of governmental and private interests.' '4 4
He limited the applicability of this test to "those exceptional circumstances
in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make
the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable. '4 5  For the
special needs doctrine to apply, a search program's primary purpose must
constitute a special need46 beyond the normal need for law enforcement,
and outweigh the privacy interest at stake and the character of the
intrusion. 47 After Blackmun's concurrence in T.L.O., the Court adopted the
special needs analysis in subsequent Fourth Amendment cases. 48
Several recent Supreme Court decisions elucidate how the Court
determines if a search qualifies as a special need. In these cases, the Court
refused to justify warrantless, suspicionless search programs under the
special needs doctrine when the searches served the "specific purpose of
incriminat[ion]." 49  Consequently, the Court declared unconstitutional
highway checkpoints for drug interdiction 50 and a hospital's policy of
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 668.3 (3d ed. 2004) (providing an overview of the
special needs doctrine).
42. Originally, the Court invoked the special needs doctrine to supplant the need for a
warrant, not individualized suspicion; however, the special needs doctrine has been
employed in the suspicionless search context. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342
n.8 (1985) ("Because the search of [the student's] purse was based upon an individualized
suspicion that she had violated school rules ... we need not consider the circumstances that
might justify school authorities in conducting searches unsupported by individualized
suspicion."); see also Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 661 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[A]Ithough the
special-needs exception was originally formulated in the context of warrantless searches, the
evolution of the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence suggests that the doctrine has
increasingly become the test employed by the Court in suspicionless search cases."
(emphasis omitted)).
43. See 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
44. See id. (citing id. at 341 (majority opinion)).
45. See id.
46. For a discussion of how a governmental interest fails to constitute a "special need,"
see Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997), which refused to characterize a state statute
requiring political candidates to submit to drug testing as a "special need." In Chandler, the
statute only fulfilled "symbolic" purposes, since it was not enacted in response to any drug
use by state officials. See id. at 307.
47. See, e.g., Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 664 n.22 (engaging in a special needs analysis).
48. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872-73 (1987) (applying special needs
doctrine); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720 (1987) (recognizing special needs
doctrine).
49. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 85 (2001) (emphasis omitted).
50. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
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testing pregnant women for drug use when law enforcement was notified of
positive results. 51
a. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond
The Court's decision in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, which held
highway drug interdiction checkpoints unconstitutional, provides guidance
for determining if a search qualifies as a special need by being beyond the
needs of normal law enforcement. 52 In Edmond, the Court distinguished an
unconstitutional drug interdiction checkpoint from permissible sobriety and
border checkpoints. 53  At the Edmond checkpoint, officers stopped a
predetermined number of vehicles, conducted an exterior open-view search
of the vehicles, guided a narcotics detection dog around the vehicles, and
verified each driver's license and registration. 54
The Court determined that since "the primary purpose of the...
narcotics checkpoint program [was] to uncover evidence of ordinary
criminal wrongdoing, the program contravene[d] the Fourth
Amendment. '55  Thus, the Court refused to "sanction [special needs
searches or seizures] justified only by the generalized and ever-present
possibility that [the search or seizure] may reveal that any given [person]
has committed some crime." 56
The "severe and intractable nature of the drug problem," which
admittedly created "social harms of the first magnitude," was deemed
insufficient to justify the drug checkpoint. 57 Observing that the same
justification could apply to various other criminal activities, the Court was
"particularly reluctant" to approve a special needs search program "where
governmental authorities primarily pursue their general crime control
ends."58
The government unsuccessfully argued that its checkpoint program
promoted highway safety by removing unlicensed or impaired drivers. 59
The Court stressed that its special needs inquiry only analyzes a search's
primary programmatic purpose. 60  Thus, the government's secondary
purposes of reducing impaired motorists and verifying licensure were
nondispositive.61 The Court noted that, if the government's secondary
51. See Ferguson, 532 U.S at 85-86 ("The stark and unique fact that characterizes this
case is that [the hospital's] [p]olicy [of potentially reporting positive drug tests to police] was
designed to obtain evidence of criminal conduct by the tested patients . . . that could be
admissible in subsequent criminal prosecutions.").
52. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48.
53. See id. at 46-48.
54. See id. at 35.
55. Id. at41-42.
56. Id. at 44.
57. See id. at 42.
58. See id. at 43.
59. See id. at 46-47.
60. See id.
61. See id.
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purposes approbated a special needs search, "law enforcement authorities
would be able to establish checkpoints for virtually any purpose so long as
they also included a license or sobriety check."'62
While the Court's decision in Edmond did not alter the balancing
component of the special needs test, the decision highlighted the imperative
of divorcing special needs searches from ordinary law enforcement searches
to uncover evidence of criminal wrongdoing. 63 Though permissible special
needs searches-such as sobriety or border checkpoints-may manifest
some law enforcement objectives, the Court noted that these permissible
special needs checkpoints "serve purposes closely related to the problems of
policing the border or the necessity of ensuring roadway safety. '64 As
Edmond clarified, for the special needs doctrine to apply, the primary
programmatic purpose of the search must be sufficiently divorced from the
normal need of law enforcement officers to obtain evidence of criminal
wrongdoing. 65
b. Ferguson v. City of Charleston
The Court further clarified the primary purpose requirement in Ferguson
v. City of Charleston.66 Due to increasing concerns over patients' cocaine
use during pregnancy, a public hospital devised a plan with city officials to
test maternity patients for illegal drug use. 67 Under this program, patients
identified as drug users could avoid criminal prosecution by attending
counseling and treatment sessions.6 8 A detailed protocol outlined a chain of
custody to ensure the admissibility of test results in subsequent criminal
proceedings. 69 Ten women arrested under the policy sued the City of
Charleston, law enforcement officials who developed the policy, and
hospital representatives for violating patients' Fourth Amendment rights. 70
The Court distinguished the Ferguson search regime from permissible
special needs search programs by observing that permissible special needs
search programs are divorced from the government's interest in law
enforcement. 7 1  The Court rejected the government's contention that
protecting the health of the mother and child allowed the search program to
fulfill the special need requirement. 72 Since "law enforcement involvement
62. Id. at 46.
63. See id. at 47 ("The constitutionality of such checkpoint programs still depends on a
balancing of the competing interests at stake and the effectiveness of the program.").
64. Id. at41.
65. See supra notes 52-62 and accompanying text.
66. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
67. See id. at 70-72.
68. See id. The initial policy, which called for the immediate arrest of substance
abusers, was modified to allow patients to successfully complete drug treatment in lieu of
arrest. See id. at 72.
69. See id. at 71-72.
70. See id. at 73.
71. See id. at 79.
72. See id. at 81.
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always serves some broader social purpose or objective," the Court
analyzed the "immediate objective" and the "direct and primary purpose" of
the search program to assess the existence of a special need.73
Consequently, the Court found that the "relevant primary purpose" was "to
generate evidence for law enforcement purposes." 74
Although the Ferguson search regime endeavored to secure counseling
and medical treatment for drug users and wielded prosecution only as a
threat for noncompliance, law enforcement involvement effectuated the
program's therapeutic goal. Therefore, the Court stated that "[t]he stark and
unique fact that characterize[d] this case is that [the search policy] was
designed to obtain evidence of criminal conduct . . . that could be
admissible in subsequent criminal prosecutions. '75 In light of the hospital's
collection of evidence for future law enforcement use in potential criminal
proceedings, the special needs exception could not apply to this program.76
Taken together, the Edmond and Ferguson cases show that search programs
with the primary purpose of securing evidence for potential criminal
proceedings cannot qualify for a special needs assessment.
2. Totality of the Circumstances Test
While the special needs doctrine has been invoked to justify searches
when no warrant or individualized suspicion of wrongdoing was present,
the Court recently broadened its general Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
by using the totality of the circumstances test to assess the constitutionality
of searches devoid of a warrant or individualized suspicion. This section
describes two recent Supreme Court decisions that implemented this mode
of analysis.
a. United States v. Knights
The 2001 case United States v. Knights assessed the constitutionality of a
search conducted pursuant to a probation condition that granted law
enforcement officers the right to search the defendant without any cause. 77
In Knights, the Court declined to undertake a special needs analysis
previously used to assess searches of probationers. 78 Instead, the Court
73. Id. at 83-84.
74. Id. at 81, 83 (emphasis omitted).
75. See id. at 85-86.
76. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
77. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001). The search condition required
the defendant to "[s]ubmit his ... person, property, place of residence, vehicle, personal
effects, to search at anytime, with or without a search warrant, warrant of arrest or
reasonable cause by any probation officer or law enforcement officer." Id. at 114 (alterations
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Despite Mark James Knights's consent to the
probation search condition, the Court refused to decide United States v. Knights on the
defendant's lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy. See id. at 118.
78. See id. at 117-18; cf Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) ("The search of
[the probationer's] home satisfied the demands of the Fourth Amendment because it was
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deemed the search of the defendant "reasonable under [its] general Fourth
Amendment approach of 'examining the totality of the circumstances,' with
the probation search condition being a salient circumstance" in applying the
totality test.79 The defendant's status as a probationer "inform[ed] both
sides of that balance" when weighing the intrusion upon the individual
versus the governmental interest.8 0
The Court found that the probation order significantly diminished Mark
James Knights's expectation of privacy by clearly expressing the search
conditions. 81  When assessing the government's interest, the Court
considered both the "significantly higher" recidivism rate of probationers as
compared to the general population and probationers' increased incentives
to conceal evidence of criminal activity.82 Finding that the government's
crime control interest outweighed the defendant's privacy interest, the Court
upheld the search, as the government can "justifiably focus on probationers
in a way that it does not on the ordinary citizen. '83
The Court in Knights premised its holding on the reasonable suspicion
present at the time of the search, though the statute authorized suspicionless
searches of probationers. 84 Consequently, the Court expressly left open the
question of "whether the probation condition so diminished, or completely
eliminated, Knights' reasonable expectation of privacy.., that a search by
a law enforcement officer without any individualized suspicion would have
satisfied the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. '85
b. Samson v. California
The Court answered the unresolved question in Knights in Samson,
which assessed the constitutionality of a state law requiring parolees to be
subject to a search by law enforcement or parole officials without cause. 86
In Samson, a law enforcement officer familiar with the defendant's parole
status from a prior encounter stopped the defendant and searched him,
uncovering methamphetamine concealed in a cigarette box.87 In upholding
carried out pursuant to a regulation that itself satisfies the Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness requirement under well-established [special needs] principles.").
79. Knights, 534 U.S. at 118 (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996)).
80. See id. at 119.
81. See id. at 119-20. The space above Knights's signature on the probation order
conspicuously warned, "I HAVE RECEIVED A COPY, READ AND UNDERSTAND THE
ABOVE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF PROBATION AND AGREE TO ABIDE BY
SAME." See id. at 114 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
82. See id. at 120.
83. See id. at 121.
84. See id. at 120 n.6, 122.
85. See id. at 120 n.6.
86. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006) (assessing constitutionality of CAL.
PENAL CODE § 3067(a) (West 2004)). For an intriguing firsthand account of the effects a
similar statute had on a law student parolee and his family, see James M. Binnall, Note, He 's
on Parole... But You Still Can't Come In: A Parolee's Reaction to Georgia v. Randolph,
13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 341 (2006).
87. See Samson, 547 U.S. at 846.
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the constitutionality of a search devoid of cause and any individualized
suspicion of wrongdoing, the Court applied a "general Fourth Amendment
approach" of examining the "totality of the circumstances to determine
whether a search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. '88 This totality analysis "assess[es], on one hand, the degree
to which [a search] intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other,
the degree to which [the search] is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests."8 9
As in Knights, the Court assessed the defendant's privacy interests,
placing extraordinary emphasis on the criminal status of the defendant to
justify the intrusion. 90 The Court observed that "by virtue of their status
alone," probationers and parolees "do not enjoy the absolute liberty to
which every citizen is entitled."91 This liberty was assessed in relation to a
"continuum" of punishments, which afforded probationers more liberty than
parolees, since "parole is more akin to imprisonment than probation is to
imprisonment. '92 Moreover, as in Knights, the state subjected the parolee
to a "clear and unambiguous search condition." 93  In light of Samson's
status and cognizance of the search condition, the Court concluded that he
lacked "an expectation of privacy that society would recognize as
legitimate." 94
For the next component of the totality test, the Court assessed the state's
interests. 95 In Samson, the Court deemed that the state's "substantial" and
"overwhelming" interests in supervising parolees, reducing recidivism, and
reintegrating parolees into society justified intrusions that would not
otherwise be tolerated under the Fourth Amendment. 96  Since "a
requirement that searches be based on individualized suspicion would
88. Id. at 848 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
89. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
90. See id. at 848-49.
91. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
92. Id. at 850.
93. See id. at 852.
94. See id. Though a lack of an expectation of privacy that society would recognize as
legitimate would normally bring a purported intrusion outside the ambit of the Fourth
Amendment, the Court in Samson v. California assessed the defendant's Fourth Amendment
protections notwithstanding his lack of an expectation of privacy. See id. at 852 n.3. Thus, a
criminal's status-and resultant diminished privacy-influences the application of the
Fourth Amendment totality test, rather than influencing the threshold determination of
whether the Fourth Amendment applies to the search. See Banks v. United States, 490 F.3d
1178, 1187 (10th Cir. 2007) ("[T]he Supreme Court in Knights informed both sides of its
reasonableness determination with the defendant's status as a convicted felon serving on
probation." (citing United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001))); United States v.
Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d 261, 265 (D. Mass. 2007), rev'don other grounds, 532 F.3d 32 (1st
Cir. 2008) ("[A] diminished expectation of privacy in [DNA] information for one convicted
of a crime ... [is a] factor ... in the context of a Fourth Amendment balancing test,
specifically on the degree of intrusion suffered. The status of a convicted criminal does not
affect the threshold question whether the Fourth Amendment initially attaches." (citing
Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 495 (D.C. Cir. 2006))).
95. See Samson, 547 U.S. at 853.
96. Id. at 853-54.
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undermine the State's ability to effectively supervise parolees and protect
the public from criminal acts by reoffenders," the Court found "eminent
sense" in requiring mere reasonableness-rather than a special need or a
quantum of individualized suspicion-to approbate the search.9 7
Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices David Souter and Stephen
Breyer, vigorously dissented, contending that the Court should have
engaged in a special needs analysis. 98 The dissent contended that previous
Court decisions did not "support[] a regime of suspicionless searches,
conducted pursuant to a blanket grant of discretion untethered by any
procedural safeguards." 99  Depicting the majority opinion as "an
unprecedented curtailment of liberty," the dissent doubted the Court's
conclusion that "a search supported by neither individualized suspicion nor
'special needs' [would be] nonetheless 'reasonable." ' 10 0
Rejecting the dissent's argument that the Fourth Amendment requires
either individualized suspicion or a special need, the majority opinion
clarified that "[t]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness,
not individualized suspicion."10' Accordingly, "the 'Fourth Amendment
imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion,' ...... although this
Court has only sanctioned suspicionless searches in limited circumstances,
namely programmatic and special needs searches, we have never held that
these are the only limited circumstances in which searches absent
individualized suspicion could be 'reasonable." 10 2
The dissent further argued that no procedural safeguards sufficiently
check an officer's discretion to obviate the necessity of individualized
suspicion, since "arbitrary exercise of discretion . . . is the height of
unreasonableness." 10 3  Moreover, the dissent deemed the majority's
expectation of privacy analysis "sophistry," since parolees have no
meaningful choice in accepting the search condition. 104
Finally, the dissent distinguished between searches performed by parole
and general law enforcement officers, since parole officers endeavor to
transition offenders back into society, while law enforcement officers serve
a crime control function.10 5 Thus, searches conducted by parole officers-
even if not based on reasonable suspicion-may be justified under the
special needs doctrine. 10 6 In light of the foregoing analysis, the dissent
admonished the majority for abandoning the Fourth Amendment's
97. Id. at 854.
98. See id. at 857 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99. See id.
100. See id. at 857-58.
101. Id. at 855 n.4 (majority opinion).
102. Id. at 856 n.4 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976)).
103. See id. at 861 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104. See id. at 863 n.4 ("[A prisoner] may either remain in prison, where he will be
subjected to suspicionless searches, or he may exit prison and still be subject to suspicionless
searches.").
105. See id. at 864-65.
106. See id.
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individualized suspicion requirement: "The requirement of individualized
suspicion, in all its iterations, is the shield the Framers selected to guard
against the evils of arbitrary action, caprice, and harassment. To say that
those evils may be averted without that shield is ... to pay lipservice to the
end while withdrawing the means." 10 7
Although the majority opinion characterized its decision as "far from
remarkable,"' 108 never before had the Court approbated a search devoid of a
warrant or individualized suspicion by invoking the totality of the
circumstances test. 109 Despite the majority's reluctance in Samson to
acknowledge the remarkable effect of its decision, the Court has provided a
new method to judge the Fourth Amendment constitutionality of
government searches.
II. DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO ASSESSING DNA EXTRACTION STATUTES
While Samson affirms that the Supreme Court favors a totality of the
circumstances approach over the special needs approach to assess the
constitutionality of government search programs targeting parolees, 1Il0 U.S.
courts of appeals have struggled to agree on how Samson's holding applies
to DNA extraction statutes.1 11 Circuit courts disagree over which Fourth
Amendment approach should be employed and which approach more
stringently and rigorously protects the Fourth Amendment. 112 Presently, a
minority of circuit courts employ the special needs approach, while most
circuit courts adopt Knights and Samson's totality of the circumstances
approach.' 13 Part II chronicles each Fourth Amendment challenge to a
federal DNA act decided by U.S. courts of appeals after Samson. Part II.A
analyzes circuit decisions that apply a special needs approach and Part II.B
discusses circuits that have adopted the totality of the circumstances
approach.
A. Circuit Court Cases Applying the Special Needs Doctrine
This section analyzes recent decisions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals for
the Seventh and Second Circuits and discusses how these cases reflect those
courts' decisions to characterize compelling DNA extraction for CODIS as
a special need. These cases argue that the special needs doctrine remains
the proper analytical framework for assessing warrantless and suspicionless
107. See id. at 866.
108. Id. at 856 n.4 (majority opinion).
109. Id. at 858-59 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Although the Court has in the past relied on
special needs to uphold warrantless searches of probationers, it has never gone so far as to
hold that a probationer or parolee may be subjected to full search at the whim of any law
enforcement officer he happens to encounter, whether or not the officer has reason to suspect
him of wrongdoing." (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873, 880 (1987))).
110. See supra Part I.B.2.b.
111. See infra Part IIA-B.
112. See infra Part II.A-B.
113. See infra Part II.A-B.
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DNA search programs, even after the Supreme Court's holding in
Samson.114 In qualifying compelled DNA extraction for CODIS as a
special need, these circuit courts deem that CODIS has several features
distinguishing it from typical law enforcement search programs that gather
evidence of criminal activity. 15
Part II.A.1 describes the Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v.
Hook, in which the court deferred to circuit precedent predating Samson and
characterized CODIS as managing supervised releasees to justify applying
the special needs doctrine. Part II.A.2 looks at the Second Circuit's recent
decision in United States v. Amerson, which attempts to distinguish the
applicability of Knights and Samson from two probationers' Fourth
Amendment challenges to the 2004 DNA Act.
1. United States v. Hook
In a post-Samson decision, the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Hook
applied a special needs framework to a supervised releasee's challenge to
the DNA collection provisions of the 2000 DNA Act and 2004 DNA
Act.1 16 A jury convicted George C. Hook of wire fraud, money laundering,
and theft involving an employee benefit plan, and he was sentenced to
eighty-four months' imprisonment and three years of supervised release. 
117
Hook's probation officer ordered Hook to provide a DNA sample after
being on supervised release for one year."i8 In response, Hook contended
that the DNA collection requirements violated the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth,
Ninth, Tenth, and Thirteenth Amendments. 1 9 Hook further challenged
these DNA Acts under the Ex Post Facto and Bill of Attainder Clause; the
Equal Protection Clause; Article I, Section 9 and Article IV, Section 2 of
the U.S. Constitution; and the separation of powers doctrine. 120 The district
court found each of these challenges to the DNA Acts unavailing.
12 1
In upholding the determination of the district court, the Seventh Circuit
invoked the special needs doctrine to defeat Hook's Fourth Amendment
challenge to the DNA Acts.' 2 2 Deferring to its precedent in a challenge to a
Wisconsin DNA collection statute that predated the Supreme Court's
holding in Samson,123 the Seventh Circuit observed,
As we found in [a prior Seventh Circuit case], taking a DNA sample is a
Fourth Amendment search, but such a search may be reasonable if it falls
into an exception to the warrant requirement. While some circuits have
114. See infra Part II.A.1-2.
115. See infra Part II.A.1-2.
116. See United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766, 772-73 (7th Cir. 2006).
117. See id. at 769.
118. Id.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 773.
123. Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2004).
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employed a reasonableness standard, we employed the "special needs"
approach in [a prior case] and will do the same here.1 24
Additionally, the court found the special needs doctrine to apply to DNA
testing, since it serves the purpose of managing supervised releasees. 12 5
In conducting its special needs analysis, the Seventh Circuit rejected the
proposition that the DNA Acts primarily serve an ordinary law enforcement
need. 126 The court determined that the DNA Acts endeavor to accurately
identify felons and deter recidivism, instead of seeking evidence for a
specific crime or detecting ordinary criminal wrongdoing. 12 7 The court
further observed that the special needs test ought to be employed since the
DNA Acts remove discretion from probation officers, as all individuals
within the DNA Acts' scope must furnish DNA samples.' 28
The court contended that even though "a DNA sample contained in
CODIS may be used at a later date in relation to law enforcement," this law
enforcement use can be distinguished from the investigation of crimes since
"such information may also be used to exonerate an individual" and the
"special need is primary."' 129 In light of the court's proffered objectives of
the DNA Acts, the DNA collection "qualifie[d] as a special need justifying
a departure from the usual warrant and probable cause requirements of the
Fourth Amendment" since the DNA collection was not undertaken for the
investigation of a specific crime, like drug testing and probation searches
are. 130 Thus, after finding that the government's interest outweighed the
defendant's, the court upheld the DNA Acts as a special need. 13 1
2. United States v. Amerson
The Second Circuit assessed the constitutionality of applying the 2004
DNA Act to defendants convicted of nonviolent crimes and sentenced only
to probation in United States v. Amerson. 132 In this appeal, the court
consolidated two Fourth Amendment challenges to the 2004 DNA Act. 133
The first challenge involved appellant Karen Amerson, who pled guilty
to one count of bank larceny for redirecting $13,500 from her employer, a
federally insured bank. 134 The district court sentenced her to three years of
probation and ordered her to provide a DNA sample. 135 Appellant Julius
Graves brought the second challenge, after pleading guilty to one count of
124. Hook, 471 F.3d at 773 (citations omitted).
125. See id. at 772.
126. Id. at 774.
127. Id. at 773.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 774-75.
132. 483 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2007).
133. See id. at 77.
134. See id. (observing that Amerson violated 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) (2000)).
135. See id.
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aiding and abetting wire fraud for allowing a neighbor to receive
merchandise procured from a stolen credit card account.136 The district
court sentenced Graves to two years of probation and likewise ordered him
to furnish his DNA sample. 137
The Second Circuit began its discussion with the observation that "[t]he
Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures."1 38
Although commencing its discussion with the rhetoric of reasonableness,
the court rejected a totality of the circumstances analysis of the DNA Acts
due to the lack of individualized suspicion: "[S]uspicionless searches-
such as those permitted by the 2004 DNA Act-are highly disfavored since
they dispense with the traditional rule that a search, if it is to be deemed
reasonable, must be either supported by a warrant . . . or justified by
evidence establishing individualized suspicion of criminal misconduct."' 139
To support this proposition, Amerson relied on a 2000 Supreme Court
case-predating both Knights and Samson-that noted "[a] search or
seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion
of wrongdoing."1 40
The court rejected the government's contention that Knights and Samson
legitimize the use of a general balancing test for probationers in the absence
of individualized suspicion, since Samson's holding relied on the "'severely
diminished expectations of privacy"' of parolees, as "'parolees are more
akin to prisoners than probationers."' 141
Without ruling on the issue, the court conceded that Samson might
undermine a prior Second Circuit ruling that applied special needs analysis
to DNA indexing of prisoners.' 42 However, since no Supreme Court
authority supported that the privacy expectations of probationers are
sufficiently diminished to invoke a general balancing test, the court rejected
the contention that Samson requires the totality test's application to
probationers. 143  Observing that since the court in Samson "expressly
acknowledged that probationers have a greater expectation of privacy
than.., parolees," the court deemed that "nothing in Samson suggests that
a general balancing test should replace special needs as the primary mode of
analysis of suspicionless searches outside the context of the highly
diminished expectation of privacy presented in Samson." 144
136. See id. (observing that Graves violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1343).
137. See id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 77-78.
140. See id. at 78 (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000)
(finding drug checkpoint unconstitutional under special needs analysis)).
141. See id. at 79 (quoting Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850-51 & n.2 (2006)).
142. Id. at 79 n.5 ("[S]ince the Supreme Court stated in Samson that prisoners have at
least as diminished expectations of privacy as parolees, Nicholas[ v. Goord]'s holding as
applied to prisoners may well have been undermined by Samson." (citing Samson, 547 U.S.
at 850)).
143. See id. at 79.
144. See id.
2008]
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When applying its special needs analysis, the court first assessed if
CODIS qualified as a special need. Starting with the belief that the 2004
DNA Act's primary purpose was to reliably ascertain an offender's identity
to help solve crimes, 145 the court offered multiple justifications to show that
compelling DNA extraction for CODIS does not achieve "normal" law
enforcement goals.' 46
First, the court deemed the DNA collection incompatible with the normal
warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment, since
the Act mandates collecting DNA from all felons without exception. 47
Since officers have no discretion as to which felons to obtain DNA samples
from, requiring a warrant would not curtail the arbitrary exercise of police
power. 148 Accordingly, the blanket nature of the DNA collection regime
divorced it from "(a) investigating a particular crime committed by the[]
defendants, or (b) ...the likelihood of these defendants' committing a
future crime." 149
Moreover, the 2004 DNA Act does not endeavor to obtain a normal law
enforcement end since "it does not involve the 'normal' law enforcement
objective of uncovering evidence that is itself proof of the commission of a
specific crime." 150 Consequently, "the 'special' law enforcement activity
of creating and maintaining a DNA index fulfills important purposes that
could not be achieved by reliance on 'normal' law enforcement
methodology."' 15' While "normal" law enforcement methods dictate that
DNA samples be collected after the commission of a specific crime, the
court identified three characteristics of CODIS that removed it from the
ambit of "normal" law enforcement. 152 First, CODIS allows perpetrators
whom would otherwise remain unidentified to be caught.' 53 Second, the
database offers "unparalleled speed" and "accuracy" in solving crimes. 154
Finally, CODIS rapidly excludes the innocent from investigations-a
"[c]ritical[]" factor that distinguished the database from normal law
enforcement. 155
After establishing that CODIS qualified as a special need, the court then
analyzed the context-specific reasonableness of the special need as applied
to the appellants. 156 The court assessed three factors when applying this
test: (1) the nature of the privacy interest, (2) the character and degree of
145. See id. at 81.
146. See id. at 82-83.
147. See id. at 82.
148. See id.
149. Id. at 82 n.8.
150. Id. at 82.
151. Id. at 82-83.
152. See id. at 83.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 83-84.
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the intrusion, and (3) the nature and immediacy of the government's needs
in light of the search policy's efficacy in addressing them. 157
When assessing the first prong, the court determined-under Samscn's
holding-that probationers have a reduced expectation of privacy that
permits greater intrusion upon their Fourth Amendment rights. 15 8 The court
characterized the intrusion of collecting blood as "minimal," "not
significant," and "commonplace," 159 though blood collection is the "most
intrusive of the usual collection techniques" and accordingly implicates a
greater privacy interest than the use of a cheek swab for DNA collection. 160
Subsequently, the court assessed the intrusion of analyzing and
maintaining the appellants' DNA. CODIS presented a "significant
intrusion" into "very strong privacy interests."1 6 1 However, the court found
that the 2004 DNA Act provided adequate safeguards, such as only
analyzing junk DNA and permitting weighty penalties for misuse of the
DNA samples or profiles. 162 Moreover, the 2004 DNA Act applied only to
felons, who have a "severely diminished" expectation of privacy in their
identities. 163 Consequently, the court analogized the intrusion as "'similar
to the intrusion wrought by the maintenance of fingerprint records.""' 164
Although the court analogized DNA samples to fingerprint records, the
court distinguished these identification methods by their accuracy. 165 Thus,
since DNA identification produced "more accurate ... identification," the
court deemed it "less intrusive ... because of the associated reduced risk
that the sample will result in misidentification. ' 166 Moreover, since the
state already maintained a "plethora" of felons' identifying information, the
incremental privacy intrusion mandated by the 2004 DNA Act was
",small."16 7
157. See id.
158. See id. at 84. ("It is in this context of a reduced expectation of privacy that the
government's intrusion on the defendant's interests must be considered.").
159. See id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
160. See id. at 84 n. 11. No facts in the record indicated that the appellants would be
subjected to a blood extraction for their DNA. See id. Nevertheless, the court assumed-as
did the parties-that a blood extraction would be employed. See id.; cf United States v.
Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 817 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that FBI guidelines require blood
extraction method for DNA samples). The FBI's requirement that DNA samples be derived
from blood extractions ought to be examined, as a buccal swab can achieve equivalent
effectiveness for law enforcement use without the bodily invasion of a needle-based
extraction. See generally United States v. Holmes, No. 2:02-CR-0349-DFL, 2007 WL
529830, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2007) (observing that "the DNA profile uploaded into
CODIS does not differ depending upon whether it was drawn from a blood cell or a cheek
cell").
161. See Amerson, 483 F.3d at 85; see also supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
162. See Amerson, 483 F.3d at 85.
163. See id. at 86.
164. See id. (quoting Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 671 (2d Cir. 2005)).
165. See id.
166. Id.
167. See id.
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Surprisingly, the court observed that furnishing DNA samples to CODIS
has "the potential to provide a net gain in privacy . . . . [since CODIS]
exculpate[s] . . . individuals by avoiding misidentification and, thus,
prevent[s] much more serious invasions of their privacy in the future."' 168
Even though CODIS retains offenders' information long after their status as
probationers, this would not change the court's privacy analysis because of
the "strong enough public interest in retaining" the information and the
"well established" practice of permanently maintaining identification
records-such as fingerprints and photographs-of convicted felons. 169
Accordingly, in light of the "appellants' status as probationers," the court
described CODIS's privacy risk as "quite small."' 170
Finally, the court analyzed the government's needs and the efficacy of
the 2004 DNA Act in addressing those needs. The court deemed that "the
government ha[d] a compelling interest in rapidly and accurately solving
crimes and that having DNA-based records of the identity of as many
people as possible, especially past offenders, effectuate[d] this interest." 171
Furthermore, the 2004 DNA Act served the government's interest of
accurate prosecution by rapidly excluding innocent individuals from further
investigation. 172  Although the appellants argued that the government
lacked an interest in maintaining DNA records of nonviolent white-collar
criminals, the court determined that the appellant's nonviolent crimes did
not negate the government's interest in maintaining CODIS, which extends
beyond the deterrence of a particular offender: 173
If all that was at issue in the DNA testing was preventing the particular
individual tested from committing crimes and solving any future crime he
committed, it is unclear whether there would be a meaningful distinction
between the DNA testing and the normal law enforcement purpose of
investigating and preventing specific crimes through searches to uncover
evidence of wrongdoing, which, the Supreme Court has made clear,
cannot be a special need. 17 4
Thus, the court concluded that the DNA collection constituted a special
need because of a "whole panoply of societal benefits that stem from the
capacity to identify or to exclude individuals, quickly, accurately, and at
reasonable expense."175
168. Id. at 86-87.
169. See id. at 86.
170. See id. at 87. The court noted that its analysis and conclusion is "highly context
dependent." See id. The court considered that its conclusion might change if scientific
advances allow mining of nonidentifying information from CODIS's DNA records. See id.
171. Id.
172. See id. at 88.
173. See id. at 89.
174. See id. at 89 n.16.
175. See id. at 89 (emphasis omitted). Considering that DNA collection serves a broader
social purpose, the court noted that "the government's interest in getting appellants' DNA
samples is not much attenuated by the fact that appellants are non-violent felons." See id.
However, this justification would probably not apply to law-abiding citizens since "felons-
[Vol. 77
2008] DNA EXTRACTION STA TUTES AFTER SAMSON 937
B. Circuit Courts Applying the Totality of the Circumstances Test
This section analyzes recent U.S. court of appeals cases assessing
compulsory DNA extraction statutes under Samson's totality of the
circumstances test. Generally, courts use this method on the basis that
Samson affirmed that the Fourth Amendment only prohibits unreasonable
searches. Though nascent Supreme Court authority supports adopting this
approach, one scholar has advocated for a totality assessment even prior to
Samson. David H. Kaye contends that since Edmond and Ferguson confine
special needs searches to search programs not designed to catch or deter
offenders, courts should create a "biometric identification exception" to the
Fourth Amendment. 176 This biometric identification exception would
harmonize prior Fourth Amendment cases permitting the retention of
criminals' fingerprints and photographs with cases allowing mandatory
DNA extraction. 177 In proposing this new exception, Professor Kaye relies
on the Reasonableness Clause of the Fourth Amendment, 178 which was the
basis for the Supreme Court's decision in Samson. Presently, six U.S.
courts of appeals apply Samson's approach in the compelled DNA
extraction context.
1. United States v. Conley and Wilson v. Collins
Avoiding the contention amongst the circuit courts on which Fourth
Amendment approach applies to compelled DNA extraction, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Conley declined to adopt
a specific Fourth Amendment approach.179 In this decision, the court found
that the special needs and the totality of the circumstances tests both justify
extracting DNA from a white-collar felon. 180 The decision did not indicate
which approach the court preferred.
For its special needs analysis, the court found that DNA extraction
endeavors to obtain reliable proof of a felon's identity to solve past and
future crimes.' 81 The court contended that Edmond and Ferguson do not
negate a special needs finding. 182 To distinguish Edmond, the court found
that rather than seeking evidence of criminal wrongdoing, CODIS simply
maintained proof of identity.183 To distinguish Ferguson, the court relied
on the patients' expectations of privacy in voluntary medical tests. 184
whose DNA is being mandatorily collected pursuant to the statute before us-are often, in
practice, at particular risk of being accused of subsequent crimes." See id. at 88.
176. See David H. Kaye, Two Fallacies About DNA Data Banks for Law Enforcement, 67
BROOK. L. REv. 179, 204 (2001).
177. See id.
178. Seeid. at205.
179. See United States v. Conley, 453 F.3d 674 (6th Cir. 2006).
180. See id.
181. See id. at 678-79.
182. See id. at 679.
183. See id. at 678-79.
184. See id. at 679.
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Unlike the voluntary medical tests the patients had in Ferguson, a defendant
subject to a DNA extraction statute understands the extraction's law
enforcement purposes. 185
In conducting a totality assessment, the Sixth Circuit first noted that the
defense offered no reason for its claim that a totality approach is "more
stringent."' 186 Nevertheless, the court deemed that the government's interest
in properly identifying criminals and deterring further crimes outweighed a
felon's limited expectation of privacy in a blood draw used solely for
identification purposes. 187
Subsequently, the Sixth Circuit in Wilson v. Collins applied the totality of
the circumstances test.' 88 In Wilson, a prisoner convicted of felonious
assault brought numerous constitutional challenges to Ohio's DNA Act,
which the court characterized as "materially indistinguishable" from the
federal DNA Acts. 189
The district court applied the special needs test to Antoine D. Wilson's
Fourth Amendment challenge. 190  The court deemed this test more
stringent, as it requires a court to identify a special need as a threshold
before balancing the parties' interests. 191  Diverging from the district
court's analysis, the Sixth Circuit found that "courts have viewed Samson
as affirmatively signaling that the totality-of-the-circumstances test is the
appropriate test for assessing the reasonableness of suspicionless DNA
collection requirements as applied to parolees and supervised releasees."' 192
As the Supreme Court invoked Samson's totality assessment for a parolee,
the Sixth Circuit found it fit to apply the totality test to a prisoner-whose
privacy interest is even more diminished than a parolee's. 193
Borrowing from its previous decision in Conley, the court identified
several compelling needs justifying the DNA collection program:
"obtaining reliable proof of convicted felons' identities; promoting
increased accuracy in the investigation and prosecution of crimes; deterring
convicted felons from committing additional crimes, thereby protecting
communities in which they are eventually released; and aiding in the
solving of crimes by serving to exculpate the innocent and inculpate the
guilty."' 194  Because these interests outweighed Wilson's diminished
privacy as a convict, the court upheld the extraction of his DNA. 195
185. See id.
186. See id. ("Conley argues that ... Knights required a more stringent [totality of the
circumstances] test .... [She] makes no attempt to explain how that test is more stringent,
however." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
187. See id. at 679-81.
188. See Wilson v. Collins, 517 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2008).
189. See id. at 423, 428. Unlike the federal DNA collection procedure, Ohio collects
DNA specimens through the less intrusive buccal swab. See id. at 423.
190. See id. at 426.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id. at 427.
194. Id.
195. Seeid.
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2. United States v. Weikert
In United States v. Weikert, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit applied a totality of the circumstances analysis to the 2000 DNA
Act. 196 The defendant, Leo Weikert, pled guilty to one count of conspiracy
to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute. 19 7 While serving his ten-
year sentence, he escaped from prison and was sentenced to eight months in
prison and twenty-four months of supervised release to follow his
incarceration. 198 After being released from prison, Weikert challenged the
probation office's request to take his DNA.199 The district court engaged in
a special needs analysis due to the lack of individualized suspicion and
found that no special need existed, because the government's objectives in
collecting DNA samples were not beyond the normal need for law
enforcement.2 0 0  Continuing with its analysis, the district court also
reasoned that Weikert's privacy interests outweighed the government's
interest in obtaining his DNA sample.2 0'
The circuit court observed that much of the authority on the
constitutionality of the 2000 DNA Act predated Samson.20 2 Samson
provided guidance on resolving the circuit split regarding the correct test to
assess the constitutionality of the mandatory DNA extraction since, "[p]rior
to Samson, the Court had never held that the totality of the circumstances
was the appropriate test to apply in a suspicionless search of a conditional
releasee."20 3  The First Circuit hypothesized that the Supreme Court
undertook a totality analysis in Samson because the search may not have
qualified as a special need.2 0 4 Similarly, the court questioned if CODIS
qualified as a special need, since extensive legislative history reveals that
"law enforcement objectives predominate. 20 5
The court then criticized the Second Circuit's interpretation of Samson in
Amerson that restricted Samson's holding only to parolees,2 0 6 since no
rationale exists to allow courts to distinguish between the Fourth
Amendment tests applicable to supervised releasees and other conditional
releasees. 20 7 Consequently, the court argued that the analysis used for
parolees in Samson can be applied to supervised releasees, because circuit
196. See United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007). In a subsequent Fourth
Amendment challenge to the 2000 DNA Act, the First Circuit applied United States v.
Weikert to reverse a trial court's decision that misapplied the totality of the circumstances
test. See United States v. Stewart, 532 F.3d 32, 33-34 (1st Cir. 2008).
197. See Weikert, 504 F.3d at 4.
198. See id. at 4-5.
199. See id. at 5
200. See id.
201. See id. Samson was decided after the district court's decision. See id. at 10 n.8.
202. See id. at 9.
203. See id. (emphasis omitted).
204. See id. at 9-10.
205. See id. at 10.
206. See supra Part II.A.2.
207. See Weikert, 504 F.3d at 10-11.
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courts "have not distinguished between parolees, probationers, and
supervised releasees for Fourth Amendment purposes." 20 8
In applying the totality of the circumstances test, the court balanced
Weikert's expectations of privacy with the government's interest in
conducting the search. Weikert had a "substantially diminished expectation
of privacy" due to his status as a conditional releasee. 20 9 Although a blood
draw intrudes more than an external search such as fingerprinting, the court
did not find that the blood draw would intrude significantly or unusually
upon Weikert. 210 Additionally, the defendant's claim that data may be
misused in the future did not factor into the court's analysis, as the
balancing test employed "focuse[d] on present circumstances." 211
The court identified several governmental interests in collecting
Weikert's DNA. First, the government had an interest in identifying,
monitoring, and rehabilitating supervised releasees.212  Second, the
government endeavored to accurately and efficiently solve crimes and
exonerate those wrongfully suspected of criminal activity.213 Finally, since
the 2000 DNA Act requires all felons to submit DNA samples, no potential
abuses of discretion undermined the government's interests. 214
The government's interests outweighed Weikert's privacy interests in
light of his status as a supervised releasee, the minimal intrusion of the
blood draw, and the statutory restrictions on the use of the DNA sample. 215
Though the court approved the search, it noted some hesitancy in
establishing a precedent, observing that "[e]very doctrine can be applied to
future cases in ways that may or may not be desirable," so "a concern for
potential future applications cannot justify a result at odds with the
circumstances of the case before us."216
3. Johnson v. Quander
While the First Circuit relied on Samson to apply a totality of the
circumstances test to compelled DNA extraction of probationers, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit adopted Knights to
legitimize the use of a totality assessment. In Johnson v. Quander, the
court assessed the constitutionality of applying the 2000 DNA Act to Lamar
Johnson, a convicted robber who received a suspended sentence and two
208. See id. at 11 (quoting United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 817 n.2 (9th Cir.
2004)).
209. See id. at 12.
210. See id.
211. See id. at 13. The court acknowledged that it would reconsider the reasonableness of
DNA collection if scientific advances allow the deduction of private, nonidentifying
information from junk DNA samples. See id.
212. Seeid.
213. See id. at 14.
214. See id.
215. See id. at 14-15.
216. See id. at 15 n.12.
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years of probation. 217 Relying on Knights, the court applied a balancing
test to find that the defendant's reduced privacy interests could not
outweigh the government's interest in monitoring probationers, deterring
recidivism, and protecting the public.2 18 Finding that CODIS operates like
an efficient fingerprint database, the court determined that the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to each search of the CODIS database. 21 9
Moreover, the court rejected Johnson's claim that the government has no
right to retain his blood sample to perform tests in the future. 220 Finding
that a search is completed upon drawing the blood, further testing of the
sample was deemed nonintrusive, since it would not discern any human
activity. 221
4. United States v. Kraklio
Similarly, in United States v. Kraklio, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit assessed the constitutionality of applying the 2000 DNA Act
to a probationer under the totality of the circumstances test. 222 The court
observed that most circuits employ the "more rigorous" totality of the
circumstances test instead of a special needs analysis, since the purposes of
DNA collection extend beyond the supervisory purposes of probation. 223
After adopting the totality of the circumstances approach, the court
summarily rejected the defendant's Fourth Amendment challenge to the
2000 DNA Act, finding that the government's interest in using DNA to
investigate crimes outweighed the defendant's diminished expectation of
privacy as a probationer.224
5. Banks v. United States
Prior to its latest decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit has been inconsistent in its Fourth Amendment analysis of
compelled DNA extraction statutes.22 5 In its most recent case on compelled
DNA extraction, the Tenth Circuit entertained a Fourth Amendment
challenge to the 2004 DNA Act by nonviolent felons serving supervised
217. See Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 491-92 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
218. See id. at 493-97.
219. See id. at 499.
220. See id. at 499-500.
221. See id.
222. See United States v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2006).
223. See id. at 924.
224. See id. ("The circuits favoring the reasonableness [totality] standard have concluded
'the purpose for the collection of DNA goes well beyond the supervision by the Probation
Office of an individual on supervised release'...." (citing United States v. Sczubelek, 402
F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 2005))).
225. Compare United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2003) (applying special
needs doctrine), with Shaffer v. Saffie, 148 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 1998) (assessing totality of
the circumstances), Schlicher v. Peters, 103 F.3d 940 (10th Cir. 1996) (same), and Boling v.
Romer, 101 F.3d 1336 (10th Cir. 1996) (same).
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release and probation in Banks v. United States.226 In its decision, the court
admitted its inconsistent analytical approaches to DNA extraction, but
noted that its prior decision employing a special needs framework failed to
articulate how CODIS qualified as a special need.227
In Banks, the court found no sufficient distinction to warrant treating
parolees, supervised releasees, probationers, or prisoners different for
purposes of choosing a Fourth Amendment analytical framework.228
Accordingly, the court relied on Knights and Samson as support that a
balancing test can be used to assess Fourth Amendment challenges to DNA
collection statutes. 229
When assessing the privacy interests afforded to different classes of
offenders, the court observed that prisoners comprise their own category, as
their custody extinguishes their privacy.230 The court found that persons on
conditional release, parole, probation, and supervised release have
substantial curtailments on their liberty that categorically justify DNA
extraction. 231 Similarly, the court noted that collecting a former felon's
DNA is justified by its potential to solve future crimes, as maintaining
criminal justice records rationally relates to a conviction. 232
Contrapuntally, the court observed that those never convicted of a felony
receive greater Fourth Amendment protection.233 Applying the totality of
the circumstances approach, the court analogized DNA extraction to
fingerprinting. 234  In so doing, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the
"significant" government interests in identifying offenders, solving crimes,
and combating recidivism outweighed the felons' privacy interests.235
6. United States v. Kriesel
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v.
Kriesel considered a challenge to the 2004 DNA Act by a convicted felon
on supervised release. 236 The court found that no case prior to Samson
226. 490 F.3d 1178, 1181-83 (10th Cir. 2007).
227. See id. at 1183-84 (collecting cases demonstrating inconsistent Fourth Amendment
analytical approaches).
228. See id. at 1184.
229. See id. at 1185.
230. See id. at 1186 (citing Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 679-81 (7th Cir. 2004)
(Easterbrook, J., concurring)).
231. See id. (citing Green, 354 F.3d at 679-81).
232. See id. at 1187 (citing Green, 354 F.3d at 679-81). Though not explicitly articulated
by the court, it intimated that nonfelons-such as those convicted of a misdemeanor or
citizens just arrested on suspicion of a crime-enjoy a Fourth Amendment privacy interest in
their DNA that outweighs the government's criminal justice interests. See id.
233. See id (citing Green, 354 F.3d at 679-81).
234. See id. at 1185, 1188, 1190, 1192-93.
235. See id. at 1193.
236. See United States v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2007). The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit subsequently determined that United States v. Kriesel
foreclosed a subsequent Fourth Amendment challenge to the 2004 DNA Act. See United
States v. Zimmerman, 514 F.3d 851, 855 (9th Cir. 2007).
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addressed the issue of which Fourth Amendment approach to apply in this
context. 23 7 "Taking [its] cue from Samson," the court applied the totality of
the circumstances test.238
In applying this test, the court invoked Samson's proposition that a
parolee's reduced expectation of privacy permits greater governmental
intrusions. 239 Though acknowledging the defendant's "'cherished"' interest
in his bodily integrity, the court determined that the government's interests
in identifying crimes committed while the defendant was at large, reducing
recidivism, and solving past crimes outweighed the intrusion. 24 0
Judge Betty B. Fletcher dissented on the basis that the government's
interests did not sufficiently outweigh the defendant's privacy interest in the
totality test.24 1  While agreeing that Samson establishes the proper
framework for assessing a Fourth Amendment challenge to compelled DNA
extraction, she noted that the search of the parolee in Samson correlated
with the government's supervisory purpose. 242 Accordingly, the dissent
argued that Samson does not approbate searches "untethered from an
immediate supervisory need."243  Despite claiming no immediate
supervisory need in compelling DNA extraction for CODIS, the dissent
concluded that the government lacked a sufficient interest to overcome the
defendant's privacy.244 Thus, the Ninth Circuit has joined the majority of
circuits in holding that the totality of the circumstances test is the proper
analytical framework for assessing Fourth Amendment challenges to
compelled DNA extraction.
III. ANALYZING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT APPROACHES
This Note has chronicled various rationales espoused by U.S. courts of
appeals for adopting either the special needs or the totality of the
circumstances approach to assess Fourth Amendment challenges to DNA
extraction statutes. Part III.A of this Note resolves the minor disagreement
amongst several circuit courts regarding which Fourth Amendment
approach is more stringent and rigorous. Part III.B of this Note argues that
while the special needs approach more rigorously and stringently protects
the Fourth Amendment in the context of a specific controversy, courts will
more rigorously protect the Fourth Amendment by foregoing a special
needs assessment in the DNA extraction context. By doing so, courts will
maintain the integrity of the special needs exception against precedents that
erode the threshold requirement for a government search program to qualify
as a special need. Part III.C of this Note concludes that the majority of
237. See Kriesel, 508 F.3d at 946.
238. See id. at 947.
239. See id.
240. See id. at 948 (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966))
241. See id. at 958 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
242. See id. at 952-53.
243. See id. at 953.
244. See id. at 955-58.
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circuit courts correctly applied the totality of the circumstances approach to
assess laws compelling DNA extraction.
A. The Special Needs Doctrine's More Stringent and Rigorous Fourth
Amendment Protections
Though the major disagreement among the U.S. courts of appeals
concerns which Fourth Amendment approach to apply, courts have also
disagreed on which Fourth Amendment approach more stringently and
rigorously protects the Fourth Amendment. 245  While both Fourth
Amendment tests require balancing a defendant's interests against the
government's, the special needs test adds the special need requirement to a
general balancing test, thereby rendering it the more rigorous Fourth
Amendment approach for assessing compulsory DNA extraction. The
Second Circuit aptly found "puzzling" the proposition that the totality
approach is more rigorous:
The special needs exception requires the court to ask two questions. First,
is the search justified by a special need beyond the ordinary need for
normal law enforcement? Second .... is the search reasonable when the
government's special need is weighed against the intrusion on the
individual's privacy interest? A general balancing test, on the other hand,
only requires the court to balance the government's interest ... against
the individual's .... 246
Since the balancing component of the special needs test is akin to a totality
of the circumstances determination, DNA extractions approbated under the
special needs doctrine would also be approved under a totality of the
circumstances assessment.247 Thus, when applied to a specific case, the
special needs doctrine more stringently and rigorously protects Fourth
Amendment freedoms.
B. Applying the Special Needs Doctrine to Compelled DNA Extraction
Search Programs
Although Part III.A of this Note demonstrated that the special needs test
is more stringent and rigorous, applying this test in the DNA extraction
context actually undermines Fourth Amendment protections. Prior to
Samson, no Supreme Court authority would permit compulsory DNA
extractions without a warrant, individualized suspicion, or a special need.2 48
245. Compare United States v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922, 924 (8th Cir. 2006) (characterizing
totality test as more rigorous), with United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 9-10 (1st Cir.
2007) (doubting that a DNA extraction statute satisfying the totality of the circumstances test
would satisfy the special needs test).
246. Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 664 n.22 (2d Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
247. See United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 80 n.6 (2d Cir. 2007) ("[H]ad we
concluded that it was appropriate to apply a general balancing test to the suspicionless
searches of probationers-which we did not-we would have reached the same result that
we do under the special needs test.").
248. See supra notes 102, 106-09 and accompanying text.
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Concerned with the monumental governmental interests CODIS furthered,
courts were initially forced to fit CODIS into the special needs rubric to link
criminals to their crimes. Since Samson provides courts with a new Fourth
Amendment approach to justify the monumental governmental interests
CODIS furthers,2 49 courts should preserve the integrity of the special needs
exception by not broadening the special need threshold requirement to
accommodate CODIS. Placing CODIS in the special needs rubric threatens
to undermine the Fourth Amendment protections the Supreme Court
established in Edmond and Ferguson.250 By applying a less rigorous test in
the DNA extraction context, courts will more rigorously protect the Fourth
Amendment by preventing the perpetuation of precedent that impoverishes
the requirements for a search program to qualify as a special need.
In light of Edmond and Ferguson, the DNA Acts fail to constitute a
special need sufficiently divorced from the government's general interest in
solving crime. The minority of circuits cannot sustain the contention that a
special need exists because the blanket nature of the DNA extractions show
that such searches do not endeavor to investigate particular crimes. 251 This
argument fails in light of Edmond and Ferguson, in which the Supreme
Court found that blanket search programs primarily serve law enforcement
purposes. 252 Edmond is particularly analogous, since law enforcement
officers stopped a predetermined number of motorists based on vehicle
sequence rather than officers' discretion. 253 Though the officers in Edmond
were not investigating a particular crime at the time of the checkpoint, the
search regime failed the special needs test.254 Contrary to the contention of
courts presently applying the special needs analysis to Fourth Amendment
challenges to compulsory DNA extraction statutes, the Supreme Court
iterated in Edmond that generally seeking evidence of criminal wrongdoing
places a search outside the special needs exception; it was not necessary for
the officers to conduct the search with the objective of solving any
particular crime for the search program to be unconstitutional. 255 Thus, the
minority of circuits should abandon their classification of CODIS as
sufficiently divorced from obtaining evidence of criminal activity.
Moreover, the Supreme Court's refusal to approbate Ferguson's search
program that garnered evidence for possible "subsequent criminal
prosecutions" 256 does not permit courts to invoke temporal distinctions
between the collection and prosecutorial use of evidence to legitimize the
application of the special needs test. Since CODIS can be used to solve
future crimes in possible subsequent criminal prosecutions, the government
presently employs it to garner evidence--just like the unconstitutional
249. See supra Part I.B.2.b; infra Part III.C.
250. See supra Part I.B.1.
251. See supra Part II.A-B.
252. See supra Part II.B. 1.
253. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
254. See supra Part I.B. l.a.
255. See supra Part I.B. l.a.
256. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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hospital search program in Ferguson. Thus, even if CODIS solves or deters
only nonextant crimes, CODIS still does not amount to a special need.
The minority of circuits has strained to characterize CODIS as a special
need by also reciting CODIS's panoply of benefits. 257 However, the
Supreme Court made evident in Edmond and Ferguson that only the
primary purpose of a search program determines the existence of a special
need.258  Though these cases do not enumerate a precise method to
ascertain a search program's primary purpose, one scholar has suggested a
mixed subjective-objective approach, considering factors such as a search
program's resource allocation and duration. 259 Extensive legislative history
and resource allocation suggests that the DNA Acts serve crime-solving
functions, and the indefinite duration of CODIS's records guarantees the
availability of DNA samples for prosecutorial use in subsequent criminal
proceedings. 260  Even the Second Circuit's conclusion that the Act's
"primary purpose ... is to obtain a reliable record of an offender's identity
that can then be used to help solve crimes '261 affirms CODIS's connection
to ordinary law enforcement search programs that do not qualify for a
special needs assessment.
Moreover, the Second Circuit characterized CODIS as a special need
because it "fulfills purposes that could not be achieved by reliance on
'normal' law enforcement methodology. '262 To the extent Edmond and
Ferguson limit a special needs assessment to a search's primary
programmatic purpose, this justification should be abandoned. The
assertion that CODIS qualifies as a special need since it is not a "normal"
law enforcement method equivocates the meaning of "special need."
Certainly, any law enforcement innovation-such as the unprecedented
drug testing program in Ferguson-could be deemed a "special need" if
innovativeness determined specialness. The Second Circuit's recitation of
"qualitative and quantitative advantages over the alternatives" is not only
irrelevant to determining the existence of a special need, but also
demonstrates CODIS's incriminatory nexus to the alternative "normal"
methods of solving crime-which do not qualify for special needs
treatment.263
CODIS's potential to exonerate the innocent presents the least persuasivejustification for the special need. An innocent suspect should not be
compelled to provide exculpatory evidence. Moreover, exoneration of the
257. See supra Part II.A-B.
258. See supra Part I.B. 1.
259. See generally Brooks Holland, The Road 'Round Edmond: Steering Through
Primary Purposes and Crime Control Agendas, Ill PENN ST. L. REv. 293 (2006).
260. See DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, H.R. REP. No. 106-900, pt. 1,
at 26-27 (2000), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2323, 2324 (observing CODIS will solve
crimes "by matching DNA from crime scenes to convicted offenders" for "law enforcement
identification purposes").
261. See United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 2007).
262. See supra notes 146-55 and accompanying text.
263. See supra Parts I.B. 1, II.A.2.
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innocent is equivalent to the ordinary law enforcement goal of
incriminating the guilty.264 Additionally, extensive empirical evidence
suggests that the government vigorously resists prisoners' efforts to use
DNA evidence for exculpation. 265 Even to the extent that CODIS frees the
innocent, as a nonprimary purpose, it is irrelevant to qualifying CODIS as a
special need.
In light of the foregoing analysis, courts should not continue to apply the
special needs framework when assessing Fourth Amendment challenges to
compelled DNA extraction. CODIS simply exists to provide evidence of
criminal activity. 266  By broadening the special needs doctrine to
accommodate CODIS, courts invite other law enforcement search regimes
to find justification under the closely guarded special needs exception to the
Fourth Amendment. By lowering the threshold of what constitutes a
special need, courts will create precedent for law enforcement search
regimes of greater breadth and magnitude to encroach upon Fourth
Amendment protections.
C. Applying Samson's Totality of the Circumstances Assessment to
Compelled DNA Extraction
When assessing Fourth Amendment challenges to mandatory DNA
extraction, courts should follow the majority of circuit courts by applying a
general totality of the circumstances test per Knights and Samson.267 As
Samson iterated, a totality of the circumstances analysis is not a novel
"exception," but rather the "general Fourth Amendment approach" courts
should adopt when adjudicating Fourth Amendment claims.268 After all,
the Fourth Amendment only proscribes unreasonable searches. 26 9
Though courts may now adopt a less stringent test for assessing Fourth
Amendment challenges to compelled DNA extraction, applying Samson's
totality test in the criminal DNA extraction context still protects the Fourth
Amendment. As described above, using a less rigorous approach in the
compelled DNA extraction context will more rigorously protect the. Fourth
Amendment by preserving the integrity of the special needs exception.
Moreover, Samson stressed that a totality test would only sanction
suspicionless searches in "limited circumstances." 2 70  These limited
circumstances appear circumscribed by an offender's criminal status, as
264. See Sandra J. Carnahan, The Supreme Court's Primary Purpose Test: A Roadblock
to the National Law Enforcement DNA Database, 83 NEB. L. REv. 1, 24 (2004) ("The first
step in the accurate prosecution of crime is for law enforcement officials to arrest the proper
suspect ... so ... the innocent may go free. For every guilty person going to prison, all
other innocent persons who might have been wrongly convicted for the same crime are, by
default, exonerated.").
265. See id. at 24 & n.135.
266. See supra Part I.A.
267. See supra Part I.B.2.
268. See supra Part I.B.2.
269. See supra Part I.B.2.
270. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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Samson approbated increased intrusions for criminal offenders "by virtue of
their status alone." 271 Since the parolee's criminal status constituted the
Court's sole basis for finding a suspicionless search reasonable under the
totality of the circumstances assessment, nothing in Samson suggests that
the less rigorous Fourth Amendment approach can be invoked to erode the
Fourth Amendment protections of the law-abiding public.
Indeed, when the Tenth Circuit in Banks chose to invoke Samson's
totality assessment, the court carefully distinguished among the Fourth
Amendment rights various offenders have, finding that those never
convicted of a felony enjoy the greatest Fourth Amendment protections. 272
This suggests that while courts may impose harsher restrictions on convicts,
law enforcement investigations targeting members of the general public fall
outside the "limited circumstances" under which a court may invoke
Samson's less vigorous totality test to justify suspicionless search programs.
As more recent state and federal DNA extraction programs permit DNA
extraction from arrestees, it will be interesting to witness how Samson's
analysis will apply in future search and seizure contexts.
CONCLUSION
The willingness of every U.S. court of appeals to uphold DNA extraction
statutes indicates the judiciary's firm support of CODIS's profound crime-
fighting capabilities. Previously, when faced with a Fourth Amendment
challenge to a DNA extraction statute, courts were left with the dilemma of
declaring the statute's search program unconstitutional or straining to assess
the search program as a special need. Since the Supreme Court in Samson
has provided a method for courts to avert this dilemma, courts can now
maintain the integrity of the special needs exception while concurrently
permitting DNA evidence retained in the CODIS database to continue
solving heinous crimes.
271. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 230-33 and accompanying text.
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